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Abstract 
Analyzing some trade indicators and estimating a gravity model, this paper assesses the potential 
effects of an effective implementation of the ECCAS FTA. Launched since January 2004, the 
ECCAS FTA is not yet established: the main reforms that should be undertaken by the various 
members are still awaited. The results show that the potential for increasing intra-ECCAS trade, 
following the FTA, is limited by the narrow range of goods produced and exported by members; 
the fact that members have comparative advantages for similar products in which they are not 
important consumers; and the low complementarity in their trade profiles. To accelerate 
industrial development through a pooling of productive resources and capacities could improve 
the complementarity of the production structures in the sub-region and thus, increase the 
possibilities of intra-industry trade, key of intra-trade growth in model FTA. 
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 ECCAS is the abbreviation of “Economic Community of Central African States”. 
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1 Introduction 
The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) was established in 1983 in 
accordance with the Lagos Action Plan, as one of the pillars of the African Economic 
Community. ECCAS covers an area of 6,641,000 km² (22% of the total area of Africa) with an 
estimated population over to 138 million in 2011 (13.3% of the total population of the continent), 
a density of 20.2 inhabitants per km², and a gross domestic product (GDP) accumulated of nearly 
73 billion U.S. dollars (USD) in 2011. ECCAS GDP is unevenly distributed among its ten states 
members: Angola (36.9%), Burundi (1.6%), Cameroon (19.8%), Congo (7.24%), Gabon 
(9.09%), Equatorial Guinea (8.07%), Central African Rep. (1.4%), Dem. Rep of Congo 
(10.18%), Sao Tome and Principe (nd), and Chad (4.7%)2. 
The Treaty establishing ECCAS was adopted in 1985 with the objectives of adopting, 
coordinating and harmonizing common policies in order to boost the economic development of 
member states through a gradual and progressive establishment of a common market and the 
suppression of barriers among Central Africa states members3. During the early years, ECCAS 
had adopted a trade liberalization program to be implemented by stages, all this through a 
gradual reduction and eventual possible suppression of trade barriers among the states members. 
The community was planning to become a customs union in 1997 after the creation of a free 
trade area (FTA) in 1993. But, financial difficulties, due to the non-payment of membership fees 
by states members, and conflicts in the Great Lakes area did not allowed the achievement of 
these goals. In 1998, the Heads of State undertook to give it new life by establishing an 
autonomous financing mechanism and widening the competences of the ECCAS Secretariat to 
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Data in this paragraph come from the World Development Indicator edited by the World Bank. 
3
 Treaty Establishing the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Libreville, 1983. 
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the development of the capacity to maintain peace, security and stability. The re-launch of the 
ECCAS was also guided by the decision of implementing a FTA by July, 1st 2004 and a customs 
union, which was initially planned for 2008 and finally postponed to 2012 (ECA/SRO-CA, 
2009). The main objective of the ECCAS FTA was to increase trade among states members and 
reduce their trade dependence towards the rest of world. 
To achieve these objectives, several measures have been adopted by the sub-regional decision-
makers. The Decisions No. 03 and 04/CEEAC/CCEG/XI relating to the ECCAS Preferential 
Tariff (TP/ECCAS) and to the modalities of the establishment of the ECCAS Compensation 
Fund were thus adopted4. Some changes in chapter VI of the Treaty and Protocols on rules of 
origin and non-tariff barriers have also been adopted to make them more consistent with the 
establishment of the FTA5. These decisions have been added to certain provisions of the ECCAS 
Treaty on intra-trade liberalization, including articles 27 and 33.These articles compel to states 
members to reduce, soften and ultimately remove quota system and other non-tariff barriers to 
trade among states members6.We also notice that the articles 36, 37, 47and 67 which define the 
rules for transit and trade facilitation inside the community7. 
An important aspect of the trade liberalization in the ECCAS is the fact that the tariff reduction 
was centered on the concept of “shared territoriality”. This concept implies applying the 
CEMAC8Generalized Preferential Tariff (TPG/CEMAC) in trade among ECCAS states members 
that belong to the CEMAC zone and the TP/ECCAS in trade among the other ECCAS states 
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See Protocol on the Fund for Compensation for Loss of Revenue. 
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See Protocol on the Rules of Origin for products to be traded between member states of the ECCAS. 
6
See Protocol on Non-Tariff Trade Barriers. 
7
See Protocol on Transit and Transit facilities.  
8The Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) is an organization established by six of the ten 
member states of ECCAS (Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of Congo, Equatorial Guinea and 
Gabon) to promote economic integration among them and that share a common currency, the CFA franc. 
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members that do not belong to the CEMAC zone. The aim of this strategy was to improve the 
vested interests and achievements of the other institutions in the region, especially the CEMAC 
zone, and to avoid conflicts with existing institutions, given ECCAS’ failure to meet the time 
frame of its treaty and annexed protocols (ECA, 2006). It was also expected that the ECCAS 
tariff regime will be at the same level as the CEMAC one by the end of the transitional period; 
from July 1st, 2004 to January 1st, 2007.The tariff reduction proposed by the TP/ECCAS should 
be 100% of reduction on January 1st, 2006 according to the following schedule: 
 For local products, traditional handicrafts and other minerals: 100% of tariff reduction 
from July 1st,2004; 
 For minerals and manufactured products from the community: 
o 50% of reduction from July 1st,2004, 
o 70% of reduction from January, 1st2005, 
o 80% of reduction in January, 1st2006, 
o 100% of reduction in January, 1st2007. 
Almost a decade after its official launching, the ECCAS FTA is not yet in effect: “no State has 
so far executed the Decisions relating to the FTA”.9 Moreover, it should be noticed that the intra-
regional trade is still very low. Indeed, intra-ECCAS exports moved to an average of 1.1% of 
total exports in 2001 to 0.9% in 2011 and imports turned down from 2.41% of the total imports 
to 2.39% according to UNCTAD data10. During the same period, trades with the rest of the world 
have slightly increased from 0.27% to 0.65% according to the same data sources. Given this 
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 Communiqué Final de la XVe Session ordinaire de la Conférence des Chefs d’Etat et de Gouvernement de la 
CEEAC, N’Djamena, 15 Janvier 2012. 
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 UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2013. 
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weak intra-ECCAS trade and the reluctance of the member states to implement the decisions 
relating to the FTA, we may wonder about the potential gains or losses that will derive from such 
an initiative. 
Reluctance to liberalize trade is an ongoing concern of states that can only be overcame if the 
gains are visible and shared (FAO, 206). So, will the implementation of the FTA contribute to 
increase the intra-ECCAS trade? This question is particularly relevant due to the fact that 
regional cooperation and integration is considered since the independences of African countries, 
as an important opportunity for them to integrate the world’s economy (UNECA, 2012). 
According to the trade literature, regional trade integration offers both a response to the 
structural challenge of the narrowness of domestic markets and increase policy predictability 
(WTO, 2011). Regional integration may also help to achieve economies of scale and to 
strengthen supplies and competitiveness capacities by offering to companies the possibilities to 
access to the market of the neighbors (Gillson, 2010). Regional integration is considered as a 
training ground for better integration into the multilateral trading system. Based on the 
experience of the European Union, Political scientists have long been seen regional trade 
agreements as a key factor in regional political integration. 
The aim of this paper is to assess the potential effects of the ECCAS FTA on trade flows among 
its member states, following an effective implementation of the FTA. So, if the Decisions 
concerning the ECCAS FTA are effectively implemented, could we expect an increase of intra-
trade flows? If this is the case, will this increase be a trade creation or a trade diversion? These 
are the main questions on which this paper focuses. 
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To answer all of these questions, this work will be divided into four sections as follows: Section 
2 reviews the existing literature on the effects of RTAs in Africa in general and in Central Africa 
in particular. The third section analyzes the potential effects of the ECCAS FTA using some 
trade indicators. The fourth section performs the same analysis by estimating a gravity model. 
The last section presents the conclusions and policy recommendations drawn from these 
analyses. 
2 Literature review 
Empirical studies on the effects of the RTAs are based on the theory of trade creation and trade 
diversion exposed by Viner (1950). The aim of such studies is usually to identify which of these 
two effects is more likely to occur or to win. Since Viner (1950), several studies, using a gravity 
model, have been conducted to discern the effects of RTAs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) on trade 
among member states, but their results are not conclusive: while some empirical studies find a 
positive effect of RTAs in SSA on intra-trade, others argue that these agreements do not have an 
impact on intra-Africa trade. Studies on the RTAs in Central Africa will not be left out of this 
trend. 
Foroutan and Pritchett (1993) were the first to use a gravity model to evaluate the intra-African 
trade potential and to compare it to its current level. Following the same approach, Elbadawi 
(1997) showed that the experience of regional trade integration in SSA has been a failure, like 
those in the other developing regions (e.g. Latin America). This skepticism about the effects of 
RTAs on intra-African trade has been supported subsequently by many other authors like 
Lyakurwa (1997), Longo and Sekkat (2000). Conversely, Cernat(2001), Carrere(2004), 
Coulibaly (2007), Afersorgbor and Bergeijk (2011) found that RTAs among African countries 
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have significantly increased trade among states members. Cernat (2001), studying the case of 
ECOWAS, SADC and COMESA for the years 1994, 1996 and 1998, found a highly increase in 
trade among the states members of ECOWAS and SADC (compared to non-members) following 
trade liberalization into these communities. These results were confirmed by Carrère (2004) who 
also found that ECOWAS and SADC have contributed to the increase of trade among their states 
members during the term 1962-1996. Afersorgbor and Bergeijk (2011), using a gravity model for 
35 countries for the term 1995-2006, found that the SADC and ECOWAS had a positive and 
significant effect on intra-trade flows. 
Few empirical studies have been conducted to discern the trade effects of RTAs in Central Africa 
in general and in the ECCAS in particular. Musila (2005) used a gravity model to study 
COMESA, ECCAS and ECOWAS for the term 1991-1998. He found a net trade creation for 
COMESA and ECOWAS but not for ECCAS. Avom (2005) and Gbetnkom and Avom (2005), 
still within the framework of an augmented gravity model, revealed that the CEMAC, that 
include six of the ten members of ECCAS, have had a very little effects on intra-CEMAC trade. 
Mata (2008), in an analysis of the effects of the CEMAC for Cameroon, Congo and Gabon 
concluded that the creation of the CEMAC has not improved trade integration between these 
states. EboTurkson (2012), comparing the impact of RTAs in Africa and the impact of the Lomé 
preferential trade agreement with the EU on SSA countries trade through a gravity model over 
the term 1960-2006, also found that ECCAS had no positive effect on trade among its member 
states unlike ECOWAS, EAC, SADC and IGAD had a positive impact on their intra-trade, and 
that positive effect was sometimes greater than the effect of the non-reciprocal trade agreements 
with the EU. These results, however, are contrary to those of Carrère (2006), Gbetnkom (2008) 
and Mbouandi Njinkam and Avom (2013). Using a gravity model on panel data for 150 countries 
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over the term 1962 to 1996, Carrère (2006) found that ECOWAS, SADC, CEMAC and 
COMESA agreements had positive effects on their intra-trade flows. These positive effects for 
CEMAC agreement are confirmed by Gbetnkom (2008) who found an overall positive impact of 
being member of this community on intra-trade after the 1994 reforms. Mbouandi Njinkam and 
Avom (2013), still in the context of a gravity model for the term 1995-2010, found that internal 
trade creation predominate over trade dispersion among ECCAS’ member states. 
The first observation we notice by going through this literature is that there is, no specific study 
intended to the intra-ECCAS trade liberalization. The community is almost considered in general 
studies on RTAs in Africa, which does not take into account certain characteristics of the sub-
region, including the long period of lethargy in the 90s, which has not permit the implementation 
of the trade liberalization scheme originally planned by the 1985 ECCAS Treaty. This may be a 
justification for the findings of Musila (2005) and Ebo Turkson (2012) who did not find a 
positive effect of ECCAS on intra-trade flows. In addition, these studies are ex post studies that 
have been made, assuming effective trade liberalization in that community11. But as noted by the 
CECG (2012) and WTO (2013)12, the proposed reforms to liberalize trade are still awaited. 
Therefore, these studies are primarily assessments of membership of the same community than 
assessments of trade liberalization within the area as expected under the FTA. 
This work has two main contributions. First of all, it is an ex ante assessment of the effects of an 
effective liberalization of intra-ECCAS trade as expected with the implementation of the FTA. 
Secondly, its dual methodological approach has not only the advantage to predict the potential 
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 WTO (2013), Box 2.2, page 26. 
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effects of the implementation of the FTA on intra-trade, but mostly to explain why to expect 
such effects. Such approach highlights the areas that need policy interventions to strengthen the 
benefits that could result from the ECCAS FTA. Then, this study is important for ECCAS 
member states as well as development institutions accompanying reforms in order to develop 
adjustment policy measures to mitigate potential negative impacts and maximize potential 
benefits.  
3 The trade indicators analysis of the potential effects of the 
ECCAS FTA 
This section uses trade indicators to draw specific inferences about the potential effects of the 
implementation of the ECCAS FTA. Mikic and Gilbert (2007) define a trade indicator as an 
index or a ratio used to describe and assess the state of trade flows and trade structure of an 
economy. Given the simplicity of these indicators, Plummer, Cheong and Hamanaka (2010) 
argued that they can be used at the initial stage of each decision to take a measure of trade policy, 
including the decision to join or not a FTA. The idea is that the gains or losses that will derive 
from a FTA depend on the structure and existing trade links among states members. 
In this study, we examine the following indicators: the intra-regional trade share, the export 
diversification index, the revealed comparative advantage index and the trade complementarity 
index. 
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3.1 The intra-regional trade share 
This trade index shows the relative importance of trade among the members of a FTA compared 
to their total trade. It is defined as the ratio of trade between the countries of the region on the 
total trade of these countries. The formula for its calculation is as follows:  
Intra-regional trade share i wT T , where: 
iT is the exports of region i to region i plus imports of region i from region i. 
wT is the total exports of region i to the world plus total imports of region i from the world. 
A high value of this ratio, close to 1, indicates that members of a future FTA have low initial 
trade costs among them compared to trade costs with non-member countries (Plummer et al., 
2010). Therefore, the implementation of the FTA would have significant positive effects as it 
will promote trade between the “natural trading partners”. Conversely, a low ratio resulting from 
high trade costs between members of a future FTA, predicts a smaller effect of that FTA on 
intra-trade as it will promote trade between “non-natural partners”. 
Table 1: Intra-trade of major African RECs. in % of theirs total trades. 1995-2000 
  1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 
 Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import Export Import 
CEN-SAD 7.67 5.8 6.73 6.6 6.23 7.07 6.88 6.26 7.59 6.03 
COMESA  5.56 4.43 4.82 5.01 5,235 6.34 7.9 6.9 8.05 5.64 
CAE  17.21 10.67 17.79 12.77 18.52 10.53 20.59 9.25 19.37 8.22 
CEEAC  1.07 2.19 0.91 2.43 0.78 2.35 1.59 3.54 0.91 2.39 
CEDEAO  9.74 8.4 9.09 12.45 8.76 12.47 8.27 9.87 8.19 8.81 
IGAD  11.87 7 10.98 9.15 9.9 5.41 8.49 4.49 8.45 4.1 
SADC    .. 12.41 18.77 9.32 15.83 11.22 14.65 9.89 13.36 
UMA  3.89 3.63 2.26 3.27 1.91 3 2.69 2.92 3.56 3.62 
Source: Author construction based on the UNCTADSTAT data. 
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Table1 above shows that official exports between ECCAS countries are stagnant: while intra-
ECCAS exports accounted for only 1.07% of its total exports in 1995, this proportion is 
somewhat deteriorated to be at 0.9% in 2011. This low level of trade among ECCAS member 
states is also evident looking at the intra-imports. Here we see that the intra-imports also 
remained low but stable at around 2% between 1995 and 2011. Finally, we note that among the 
eight Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union as pillars of the 
African Economic Community, ECCAS is the one that trade lesser with itself: while the 
proportion of intra-ECCAS exports is only around 0.9% in 2011, this proportion is 19.37% for 
EAC; 9.89% for SADC; 8.85% for IGAD; 8.19% for ECOWAS and 8.05% for COMESA. 
The implication of this low intra-regional trade share for ECCAS FTA is that the preferential 
trade liberalization will have a lesser effect on trade among member States As stated above, the 
low share of intra-ECCAS trade means that ECCAS member states are not “natural trading 
partners” because their initial trade cost are higher than their trade costs with the rest of the 
world. According to Plummer (2010), the implementation of the ECCAS FTA could result in a 
trade diversion. 
3.2 The export diversification index  
It is generally known that countries with a larger export base are those who derive greater 
benefits from a RTA. In fact, countries that have diversified their exports are those that produce a 
wider range of products that can be traded with regional partners in the framework of a RTA 
(Yeats, 1998). If only a limited number of these products exist, members of a RTA may have to 
rely heavily on third countries for a significant portion of their key imports. This fact should 
reduce their commitment to implement the FTA rules. 
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One way to measure the diversification of an economy is to measure the degree of market 
concentration. Among the myriad of index developed to measure the degree of market 
concentration, academician used more often the Herfindahl-Hirschman index. It has been 
standardized in order to obtain values between 0 and 1. The nearest value to 1 represents the 
highest concentration. The Herfindahl-Hirschmann is calculated using the following formula: 
 
1
1 1 1
n
i i
i
H x X n n

 
      
  
  
Where iH is the diversification index of the country i, ix   is the value of exports of the product 
(c), 
1
n
c
c
X x

  and n = number of product groups (SITC Rev. 3, 3-digit). 
The idea behind this index here is that if the RTA member states have a narrow range of goods to 
export, this will limit the effects of trade liberalization among them. These effects will be 
especially limited as the member states exports are concentrated in products that are not major 
imports for each other (Yeats, 1998). 
We notice, through the Table 2 below, that the exports of ECCAS countries are highly 
concentrated and this concentration seems even to increase over the time for countries like 
Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Chad. This may be explained by the high concentration of 
economic activities in these countries around the exploitation and export of crude oil. Cameroon, 
Central African Republic and Sao Tome & Principe are the main economies of the sub -region 
with relatively diversified exports. However, this diversification seems fragile and changes so 
slowly over the time due to a complex and unattractive business environment that discourages 
investment especially in manufacturing (CEA/BSR-AC, 2010). 
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Table 2: Export diversification index of ECCAS member states, 1995-2010. 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 
AGO 0.896047 0.882604 0.944456 0.965351 
BDI 0.583501 0.692833 0.608444 0.551099 
CMR 0.320353 0.443176 0.421407 0.370314 
CAF 0.400932 0.679933 0.44 0.331587 
TCD 0.709649 0.731281 0.720275 0.854037 
COG  0.752705 0.674731 0.786171 0.78596 
COD 0.525003 0.601545 0.414739 0.385074 
GNQ 0.522155 0.799015 0.921665 0.751039 
GAB 0.806862 0.734602 0.769535 0.726036 
STP 0.491524 0.403587 0.614244 0.387785 
Source: Author construction based on the UNCTADSTAT data. 
This excessive concentration of exports in the sub-region is an obstacle to the development of 
intra-regional trade flows because it offers a very narrow range of tradable goods among 
countries. The potential of intra-ECCAS trade is thereby decreased, even with the suppression of 
trade barriers as previewed by the FTA, due to the weakness of the supply capacities of tradable 
goods between its member states. This effect is even stronger as the exports of ECCAS member 
states are concentrated on the same small number of products, including agricultural 
commodities and mining products. 
3.3 The revealed comparative advantage index  
Traditional trade theory states that the gains from trade come from specialization in the sectors 
where a country has a comparative advantage, that means, the sectors in which the country 
produces relatively more efficiently than competitors. This difference among countries increases 
trade and makes it mutually beneficial. Nevertheless, comparative advantage is a dynamic 
concept and changes that may intervene therein are important determinants in predicting the 
effects of industrial and trade relations among the members of a FTA. According to Venables 
(2002), the effects of FTA depend on the comparative advantage of each member relating to his 
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pairs, and also relating to the rest of the world. The idea is that members of a FTA that have quite 
similar comparative advantages (especially in similar products) are less likely to have a 
permanent increase in their trade relationship resulting from preferential trade liberalization. 
Balassa (1965) and Vollrath (1991) showed that it is possible to reveal the comparative 
advantages of a country by calculating its revealed comparative advantage index (RCA). The 
original RCA index, known as the Balassa index, is the ratio of the share of the exports of 
product c in the total exports of country i ( icx / iX ) with respect to the share of world exports of 
product c on total world exports ( wcx / wX ). Mathematically, we have: 
   i i wc c i c wR C A x X x X  
If the RCA index is greater than 1, then the comparative advantage is revealed as the share of 
product c in the exports of country i is larger than the share of that product in world exports. If 
RCA is less than 1, then a comparative disadvantage is revealed. 
Table 3 below shows the relative value of the RCA index in exports of ECCAS member states. 
When reading this table, Burundi, Cameroon and Sao Tome & Principe have a comparative 
advantage in the export of food products while Burundi is the only one that has a comparative 
advantage for Beverages and Tobacco. Apart Central African Republic and Burundi, the other 
countries in the sub-region have a revealed comparative advantage in the export of oils and 
minerals products, but this advantage seems to erode over the time in most of these countries, 
except Chad and Equatorial Guinea where large reserves of oil have been discovered and are in 
exploitation since a decade. 
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Table 3: Revealed comparative advantage of ECCAS member states. 1995-2010. 
  CTCI 0 + 
22 + 4 
CTCI 1 CTCI 3  CTCI 5 CTCI 7 CTCI 27  
+ 28 + 68 
 + 667 + 971 
CTCI 5 to 8 
- 667 and 68 
AGO 1995 0.1248 0.0003 128,536 0.0001 0.0055 0.9966 0.0063 
 2010 0.0051 0.0033 62.727 0.0008 0.0204 0.1518 0.0122 
BDI 1995 71.604 11.379 0.0017 0.0239 0.011 80.785 0.0291 
 2010 107.955 26.772 0.0881 0.1817 0.088 21.373 0.11 
CMR 1995 3.276 0.4445 39.731 0.069 0.0228 15.428 0.0928 
 2010 36.988 0.4354 27.531 0.1198 0.0805 0.5301 0.1591 
COG 1995 0.216 0.029 109.100 0.0316 0.0096 0.3909 0.0652 
 2010 0.0415 0.0683 52.759 0.0045 0.1968 0.9094 0.1286 
GAB 1995 0.0233 0.0001 113.298 0.0457 0.0103 0.4488 0.0267 
 2010 0.0509 0.3181 48.286 0.0159 0.0738 13.114 0.0752 
GNQ 1995 0.9429 0.0663 45.262 0.0013 0.0137 0.0072 0.0942 
 2010 0.004 nd 60,151 0.1475 0.0369 0.084 0.047 
CAF 1995 16.274 13.653 0.0079 0.0488 0.1408 126.269 0.1132 
 2010 129.106 0.2429 0.0438 0.0879 0.1403 56.207 0.142 
COD 1995 0.811 0.3318 14.149 0.0313 0.0256 166.891 0.0385 
 2010 0.1224 0.4226 0.8291 0.3214 0.016 121,428 0.0691 
STP 1995 73.482 0.8501 nd 0.5369 0.4849 0.0176 0.524 
 2010 61.339 0.0688 nd 0.2525 0.463 0.0628 0.8894 
TCD 1995 0.1634 0.1125 0.0013 0.0097 0.1346 0.0053 0.0825 
 2010 0.0121 0.0042 60.687 0.0394 0.0093 0.0302 0.0264 
Source: Author construction based on UNCTADSTAT data.    
Note: SITC 0 + 22 + 4 = Food.  
 SITC 1 = beverages and tobacco.  
 SITC 3 = Fuels.  
 SITC 5 = Chemicals.  
 SITC 7 = Machinery and transport equipment  
 SITC 27 + 28 + 68 + 667 + 971 = ores, metals, gemstones and non-monetary gold.  
 SITC 5 to 8 less 68 = 667 and manufactured by degree of manufacturing items. 
Table 3 also reveals a comparative disadvantage of ECCAS member states for the exploitation of 
chemicals, manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. This reflects the inability of 
central Africa countries to transform and bring value added to their huge forest and mineral 
resources. 
The implication of such analysis on potential trade effects of the ECCAS FTA is evident: The 
fact that these countries have the same comparative advantages and disadvantages reduces the 
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possibilities of trade among them. These trade opportunities will be more limited as the level of 
product differentiation among these countries is very low and that these countries are net 
importers of manufactured goods for which they have a proved comparative disadvantage. 
3.4  The trade complementarity index 
The success or failure of economic integration area depends in part on the degree of 
complementarity of the economic structures of its member states. The trade complementarity 
index therefore evaluates the relevance of preferential trade agreements between two or more 
economies, by measuring the extent to which the export structure of a potential partner matches 
the imports from the other potential partner. This indicator is calculated using the following 
formula:  
1 ( ) 2ci ci ciCom m x    
Where cix is the part of the property c in the exports of country i, and cjm  is the part of the 
property c in the country's imports j. This index may be calculated for all possible combinations 
between exporters and importers, including groups of countries. The values range between 0 and 
1: 1 for pairs of countries that exports and imports structures perfectly match up and 0 for pairs 
of countries whose exports and imports structures are completely different. 
According to table 4 below, there is a very low complementarity among the trade profile of 
ECCAS FTA member states and this situation does not seem to improve with time. However, 
countries like Cameroon, Chad and Sao Tome & Principe are economies whose exports are 
relatively meeting the import requirements of other members of ECCAS due to a relative density 
and diversity of their industrial sectors. Cameroon is the economy that imports may be the most 
17 
 
covered by the sub-regional supply, especially with regard to imports of petroleum products. It is 
also the country that can cover most notably sub-regional needs for agro-industrial goods. 
Table 4: Trade complementarity index among ECCAS member states, 1995-2000. 
Importer→ 
 
 AGO BDI CMR CAF TCD COG  COD GNQ GAB STP 
AGO 1995  0.035 0.021 0.038 0.0361 0.039 0.042 0.019 0.037 0.023 
2010  0.031 0.258 0.018 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.015 0.018 0.016 
BDI 1995 0.039  0.034 0.042 0.037 0.031 0.032 0.041 0.044 0.040 
2010 0.071  0.061 0.066 0.063 0.068 0.067 0.061 0.073 0.056 
CMR 1995 0.066 0.082  0.102 0.079 0.069 0.079 0.0767 0.083 0.087 
2010 0.097 0.150  0.162 0.140 0.114 0.162 0.154 0.126 0.137 
CAF 1995 0.086 0.095 0.080  0.088 0.064 0.103 0.086 0.084 0.065 
2010 0.052 0.063 0.044  0.050 0.058 0.064 0.044 0.056 0.037 
TCD 1995 0.034 0.029 0.028 0.025  0.023 0.042 0.034 0.025 0.025 
2010 0.034 0.111 0.264 0.140  0.042 0.148 0.108 0.059 0.200 
COG  1995 0.037 0.064 0.042 0.063 0.067  0.069 0.038 0.049 0.049 
2010 0.024 0.079 0.270 0.075 0.072  0.082 0.064 0.054 0.070 
COD 1995 0.026 0.031 0.033 0.041 0.028 0.032  0.024 0.029 0.031 
2010 0.058 0.076 0.203 0.060 0.052 0.059  0.048 0.064 0.049 
GNQ 1995 0.019 0.073 0.037 0.129 0.141 0.174 0.113  0.048 0.033 
2010 0.010 0.009 0.248 0.010 0.007 0.007 0.010  0.013 0.005 
GAB 1995 0.017 0.026 0.026 0.031 0.026 0.026 0.029 0.023  0.030 
2010 0.028 0.028 0.268 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.041 0.030  0.025 
STP 1995 0.151 0.181 0.154 0.157 0.186 0.168 0.156 0.170 0.169  
2010 0.203 0.131 0.118 0.141 0.127 0.158 0.119 0.133 0.189  
Source: Author construction based on UNCTADSTAT data. 
 
This low complementarity indicates that there are fewer products for which ECCAS member 
states are exporters and importers respectively and have high stakes in their respective trade 
profiles. The similarity of production and export profiles in the sub-region shows that they have 
few goods to share, especially because they are all producers and exporters of raw materials 
(wood, crude oil, etc.). The implication is a low potential for increasing intra-regional trade 
within the ECCAS zone after an effective implementation of the FTA. But, some countries in the 
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sub-region as Cameroon will have the possibility to expand their trade by providing some 
products to other countries in the sub-region. 
4 The gravity potential effects of the ECCAS FTA 
This section completes the analysis using trade indicators above done by a more rigorous 
econometric analysis: the estimation of a gravity model. The ECCAS FTA being not yet in force, 
the econometric approach that is often used is an ex ante situation is the use of a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) model. However, these models are rarely used due to the complexity 
of their specification and the weak availability of necessary data (Greenaway and Milner, 2002). 
The ex post approach used here, through a gravity model, is to estimate post trade liberalization 
situation and then, to deduce from this estimate the potential impact of a FTA (Frankel, 1997; 
Choi and Scott, 2001; Greenaway and Milner, 2002; DeRosa and Gilbert, 2005). The potential 
for greater trade under a prospective FTA may be assessed by the significance and the magnitude 
of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables representing the prospective trade 
agreement (DeRosa and Gilbert, 2005). 
4.1 The gravity model specification 
The gravity model applied in international trade was developed independently by Tinbergen 
(1962) and Pöyhönen (1963), in reference to the Newtonian theory of gravitation. In the basic 
model, the volume of trade between countries is an increasing function of their size measured by 
their national income, and a decreasing function of transport costs approximated by the distance 
between their two economic centers. Mathematically, this is expressed as follow:  
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 .ij i j ijX A Y Y D , i j 13, 0ijD   (1), where, 
ijX is trade flows between countries i and j, iY and jY are economic sizes of country I and j(with 
respect to GDP, GNP or per capita GDP), ijD is the distance between countries. A  is 
proportionality constant. 
Since Tinbergen (1962), the gravity model has been widely used and increasingly improved in 
empirical studies of international trade. Recent theoretical and empirical studies gave more 
legitimacy to this model by including other important determinants of bilateral trade, as 
population, language / ethnicity, etc. (Anderson, 1979; Evenett and Keller, 2002; Frankel, 1997, 
Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003).The gravity model is now express of the form: 
  
*
i j i j
ij
ij
YY Pop Pop
X B
D
       (2) 
Where ( )i jPop represents the populations of countries i and j, and B represents one or more 
factors that promote or restrict trade (language, colonial relationship, common border, etc.). If we 
introduce logarithms for the both side, the gravity equation becomes linear: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6ln ln ln ln ln lnij i j i j ij ij ijX Y Y Pop Pop D B u                 
(3) 
The estimate of such equation can provides an appropriate framework for assessing the potential 
impact of RTAs on the level and direction of trade. For that, we follow the approach developed 
by Frankel (1997), Choi and Scott (2001) and De Rosa and Gilbert (2006). This approach is to 
consider not only the existing RTAs in the gravity equation, but also the future RTAs. The 
potential growth of internal trade in a future FTA, such as ECCAS, could thus be assessing 
through the significance and magnitude of the estimated coefficient of the explanatory variable 
                                                           
13
 In this study, i and j represent respectively the exporting country and the importing country. 
20 
 
representing the FTA (De Rosa and Gilbert, 2006). Also in order to isolate the likely trade 
creation and trade diversion effects deriving from the implementation of a FTA , we will follow 
the approach developed by Frankel (1997) and Carriere  (2004 ) by introducing three dummy 
variables ( int raECCAS  , creaECCAS , divECCAS ) indicative of membership or not of  the ECCAS 
FTA . The gravity equation is then specified as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 int 11 12
ln ln ln ln lnPop lnPop lnijt it jt ij it jt ijt ij
ij ij ra crea div ijt
X Y Y D RER Landlocked
Comborder ComLang ECCAS ECCAS ECCAS u
       
    
       
     
(4) 
 ijtX  are trade between countries i and j.  
 ( )it jtY  represent the GDPs of countries i and j. 
 ( )it jtPop  are the populations of countries i and j 
 ijD  is the distance between countries i and j. ijLandlocked  is a dummy variable that takes 
the value 1 if one country is landlocked, 2 if the two countries are, and 0 if no country is. 
 ijComborder  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j share a common border 
and 0 otherwise. 
 ijComlang  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if countries i and j use a common official 
language, and 0 if otherwise. 
 ijtRER  is the real exchange rate between country i and country j. 
 int raECCAS  captures the variation of trade flows among ECCAS members following the 
implementation of their FTA. It takes the value 1 if countries i and j belong to the 
ECCAS FTA and zero otherwise. 
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 creaECCAS  captures the evolution of trade flows among ECCAS members  and the rest of 
the world. This variable indicates whether the FTA will lead to trade creation or not. It 
takes the value 1 if the importing country belongs to ECCAS and the exporting country 
does not. 
 divECCAS  indicates whether the implementation of the ECCAS FTA lead or not to trade 
diversion. It takes the value 1 if the exporter is member of the ECCAS and the importer is 
not.  
4.2 Data sources 
Bilateral trade is here measured by the value of exports between countries i and j. We measure 
this variable as imports of country j from country i. The choice of this measure is justified by the 
fact that countries tend to register more imports than exports, mostly taxation purposes. This 
measure also has the advantage of taking into account transport costs as imports are recorded 
c.i.f value. Trade data used here come from UNCOMTRADE database downloaded via the 
World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) developed by the World Bank. 
Data on GDPs and populations are taken from the World Development Indicators (WDI) 
database collected by the World Bank. 
The real exchange rate between the country i and country j is calculated from the nominal 
exchange rate of these countries and their consumer prices indices according to the following 
formula:  
it it
ijt
jt jt
CPI NER
RER
CPI NER
  
   
  
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Where  it jtCPI are the consumer price index of countries and j and ( )it jtNER are the nominal 
official exchange rates. The data for these variables come from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) database of the International Monetary Fund. 
All the other variables come from “the Gravity Dataset” and the “Distance” database for 
geographic data, both developed by the CEPII14. 
Concerning the sampling, Fontagné et al. (2002) noted that the heterogeneity of the samples is 
one of the serious problems that often fail to take into account in many studies using gravity 
models. UNCTAD (2009) argues that this bias could explain why studies using more 
heterogeneous samples don’t find any positive effect of RTAs on trade between the members, 
while more homogeneous samples generally show such an effect. To avoid this bias, Foroutan 
and Pritchett (1993) and Elbadawi (1997) suggests a restriction of the sample of countries, so as 
to include only countries belong or not to the RTA but which have a per capita GDP below 3000 
US dollar. . So, our sample includes 29 exporting countries and 49 partners over the period 2000-
2010 (see annex). 
4.3 The estimation strategy 
To estimate a gravity model with panel data, two estimation techniques are commonly used: 
estimation with fixed effects and estimation with random effects. The main assumption of the 
fixed effects model is that the specific effects of each pair of countries may be correlated with 
the independent variables without being correlated with the error term. The random effects 
model is an alternative to the estimation with fixed effects. It always takes into account 
                                                           
14
Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales. 
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unobserved heterogeneity, but allows the inclusion of variables that could be correlated with the 
fixed effects (including those that do not vary over time). To decide between these two 
techniques, the Hausman test should be performed. 
Kepaptsoglou, Karlaftis and Tsamboulas (2010) reviewed the literature on the effects of RTAs 
using gravity models, and found a clear preference for the use of fixed effects because they 
control both the heterogeneity between countries and the multilateral resistance to trade. 
However, Egger (2000, 2005) noted that the random effects model should be used if the 
estimation is interested by time invariant effects as is the case of many RTAs. Indeed, since the 
dummy variables representing a RTA are often defined over the entire study period, these 
variables change only when there are changes in the composition of the RTA during the period 
(Carrere, 2006). In this study, the composition of ECCAS FTA, which is our main variable of 
interest, has not varied during the period. This makes the random effects estimation most 
appropriate for this study, because fixed effects estimation will not allow us to have coefficient 
for our main variable of interest. 
4.4 Estimation Results  
Table 3 below shows that the variables of our conventional gravity equation generally have the 
expected sign.  
The distance variables and Landlocked have significant negative coefficients as expected, 
supporting the negative impact of transport costs on trade. This inverse relationship between 
transport costs and trade is confirmed by the positive and significant sign of common border 
variable, which measures the effect of the proximity of the two partners on their trade. 
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Concerning our mains variables of interest, the variable   has a positive but not significant 
coefficient. That sign indicates a positive sensitivity of intra-ECCAS trade to trade liberalization 
initiative in the ECCAS area. But by applying the formula, it might be extrapolated that the gross 
increase of intra-ECCAS trade following an effective implementation of the FTA will be less 
than 15%. But in view of the low level of the intra-ECCAS trade, it seems not logical to 
conclude that this result does imply a substantial positive potential effect of the ECCAS FTA on 
the trade flows among its member states.     
Table 5: Estimation results 
Variables lnimports 
ln ijD t 
-1.129*** 
(0.0998) 
lnGDPi  
0.739*** 
(0.0657) 
lnPopi  
0.264*** 
(0.0715) 
lnGDPj  
0.981*** 
(0.0569) 
lnPop j  
0.107 
(0.0659) 
_ ijcomlang off  
0.356* 
(0.190) 
ijcomborder  
1.354*** 
(0.305) 
ijcomcol  
1.460*** 
(0.210) 
(j)ilandlocked  
-1.314*** 
(0.129) 
int raeccas  
0.133 
(0.341) 
creaeccas  
-0.461*** 
(0.175) 
diveccas  
-0.900*** 
(0.199) 
Constant -29.89*** 
(1.336) 
Observations 10,317 
Standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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creaECCAS and divECCAS have significant negative coefficients. The signs of these coefficients 
mean that the implementation of the FTA ECCAS will affect negatively the ECCAS members’ 
states imports from the rest of the world. So, the marginal increase in intra-trade following the 
implementation of the FTA will be at the expense of trade with the rest of the world. According 
to Viner (1950), this is a pure trade diversion, means that the increase in intra- trade that will 
result of the implementation of the FTA will not be a creation of new trade flows but rather a 
replacement of existing trade flows from the rest of the world. This could lead to a deterioration 
of the consumers’ welfare in the sub-region as they will spend more to buy community’s goods 
that will replace the cheapest ones from the rest of the world. 
5 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this paper was to evaluate the potential effects of the ECCAS FTA on trade 
flows among its member States, using two complementary methodological approaches: the 
analysis of some trade indicators and the estimation of an augmented gravity model. 
The first approach showed that the potential to increase intra-ECCAS trade, following the 
implementation of the FTA, is limited by three main factors. The first factor is the narrow range 
of goods produced and traded by its member States. The second factor is that these countries 
have comparative advantages for the same products for which they are not important consumers. 
The last factor is the low complementarity of their trade profiles, showing that these countries 
have only few goods to trade between them. 
The gravity model estimation revealed that an effective implementation of the ECCAS FTA will 
have a positive but not significant effect on trade flows among members. The small 15% of 
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potential increase of intra-ECCAS trade found by this model confirms the limited possibilities of 
trade within the ECCAS demonstrated by the previous analysis of trade indicators. In addition, 
this marginal increase in intra-ECCAS trade would be the consequence of a trade diversion from 
the rest of the world. 
The main policy recommendation we may draw from this study is that to fully benefit from trade 
creation effects the theoretical literature associated with the creation of a FTA, the ECCAS 
countries must overcome production capacities constraints they are currently facing and 
especially, those relies to their production and trade structures. This imply for these countries to 
accompany the trade liberalization process by an active common industrial policy, based on the 
transformation of their huge natural resources. This industrialization could be built by 
mutualizing their production capacities, structuring and mastering the value chains at the sub 
regional level. This could be done for example by creating industrial pools in the sub-region and 
distribute them between the member states based on their comparative advantages and strengths 
to foster manufactures with critical size to supply the entire sub-region at a competitive cost. 
Such strategy will not only enable the sub-region to ensure the necessary inputs for the local 
industry, but also to multiply opportunities for intra-industry trade, key of intra-trade growth in 
some model FTA like the European Union and, the NAFTA. 
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